Constructive Empiricism and Deflationary Truth* by Asay, Jamin
Philosophy of Science, 76 (October 2009) pp. 423–443. 0031-8248/2009/7604-0002$10.00





Constructive empiricists claim to offer a reconstruction of the aim and practice of
science without adopting all the metaphysical commitments of scientific realism. De-
flationists about truth boast of the ability to offer a full account of the nature of truth
without adopting the metaphysical commitments accompanying substantive accounts.
Though the two views would form an attractive package, I argue that the pairing is
not possible: constructive empiricism requires a substantive account of truth. I articulate
what sort of account of truth and empirical adequacy the constructive empiricist must
offer and then show why deflationists cannot uphold such an account.
1. Introduction. Constructive empiricists, those who espouse the brand
of scientific antirealism authored and championed by Bas van Fraassen
(1980), claim to offer an adequate reconstruction of the aim and practice
of scientific inquiry, all without adopting some of the more substantive
ontological and theoretical commitments of scientific realism.1 The goal
of scientific practice, according to the constructive empiricist, is not to
produce true theories but rather to produce empirically adequate theories.
A theory is empirically adequate just in case everything it says about the
observable features of observable objects is true. Hence, van Fraassen
uses truth to define both scientific realism and constructive empiricism.
Realists think that science aims for the truth about the observable and
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the unobservable; constructive empiricists argue that science settles simply
for the truth about the observable.
Theories of truth come in a variety of flavors, some more metaphysically
stark than others. On the one hand, there are theories that analyze truth
in terms of some further property, such as correspondence with the facts,
coherence, or practical utility. I refer to such theories as being substantive,
in that they admit that the notion of truth is deserving of substantial
philosophical analysis. On the other hand, there are deflationary theories
of truth that deny that all truths share a common nature. It is true that
snow is white and true that there are penguins, but those two truths do
not share any common feature in virtue of which they are true. Defla-
tionists do not posit any of the entities found in more substantive accounts,
such as a correspondence relation or realm of facts, in order to understand
the nature of truth. Constructive empiricism and deflationism about truth,
then, seem to form a natural pair; both are motivated by the traditional
empiricist inclination to make do with as little metaphysics as possible.2
My contention is that the pairing is not possible—constructive empiricism
requires a more substantive account of truth than can be offered by the
deflationist.
The essay proceeds, in Section 2, by canvassing briefly deflationary
accounts of truth. In Section 3, I explore one attempt at merging con-
structive empiricism with deflationism, albeit one that does not employ
the semantic account of scientific theories. Section 4 incorporates the
semantic theory, and I show (with help from the Game of Life) what kind
of account of truth and empirical adequacy the deflationist constructive
empiricist may offer. I argue in Section 5 that such an account is untenable.
I conclude that constructive empiricists must take on some commitments
that they normally would rather avoid, while deflationists are unable to
understand the aim of science in the way that constructive empiricists
suggest.
2. Deflationary Truth. For our purposes, we may divide theories of truth
into substantive and deflationary accounts. Substantive accounts (includ-
ing the traditional correspondence, coherence, epistemic, and pragmatic
theories) hold that truths share some common feature in virtue of which
they are true. Substantivists about truth think that the project of the theory
2. Compare Teller 2001: “van Fraassen, with his empiricist’s distaste for metaphysical
commitments, is going to be leery of espousing anything like the correspondence theory
of truth as a metaphysical view. . . . He will want to make full use of our robustly
effective practices of talk about truth without further analysis or metaphysical com-
mitments” (143).
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of truth is to offer a philosophical analysis of what that feature is.3 Cor-
respondence theorists, for example, hold that truth can be analyzed in
terms of truth bearers and facts standing in the correspondence relation.
In his earlier work, van Fraassen seems to adopt a correspondence theory
of truth: “I would still identify truth of a theory with the condition that
there is an exact correspondence between reality and one of its models”
(1980, 197).4 More recently, van Fraassen has cried “mea culpa!” on such
statements and distanced himself from correspondence theories (2006, 153;
see also his 2008, 247–249). Given van Fraassen’s current penchant for
deflationism, our question of whether constructive empiricism requires a
substantive theory of truth or whether it can make do with only a defla-
tionary account is particularly pertinent.
Deflationists about truth reject the very enterprise of offering an anal-
ysis of truth, at least in the sense employed by traditional truth theorists.
Deflationists hold that truths do not share some common property that
accounts for their truth (Quine 1970; Horwich 1990; Field 1994). Each
truth has its own individual subject matter in which its truth consists. It
is true that snow is white because snow is white, not because ‘Snow is
white’ stands in the correspondence relation to some fact. In order to
evaluate whether deflationism can be conjoined consistently with con-
structive empiricism, we must highlight two features common to most
brands of deflationary truth. Following Bar-On and Simmons (2007), we
can identify two theses common to most accounts of deflationism. First
is linguistic deflationism, the claim that the truth predicate primarily is a
logical device for disquotation.5 Appending the truth predicate to a sen-
tence adds no cognitive content to the sentence. Field, for example, argues
that the sentences ‘Snow is white’ and ‘“Snow is white” is true’ are cog-
nitively equivalent: they mean the exact same thing to the speaker who
utters them (1994, 251). Accordingly, any sentence involving the truth
predicate can be replaced, without change in truth value or meaning, by
another sentence not employing the predicate. To take a canonical kind
3. I also take primitivism—the view endorsed by Frege ([1918–19] 1956) and Davidson
(1996) that truth is a conceptual primitive that resists analysis—to be a species of
substantivism.
4. See also van Fraassen 1980, 90; 1987, 122; and 1991, 242. Ellis (1985, 49), Bub and
MacCallum (1988, 398), Jennings (1989, 236), and Psillos (1999, 179) similarly detect
a correspondence theory of truth in van Fraassen. Fine detects more ambiguity in van
Fraassen’s attitude toward truth but provides textual evidence only of van Fraassen’s
substantivism (1984, note 5, and 1986, 157). See Rosenhagen 2006 for discussion.
5. Note that for a deflationist like Horwich, truth plays a denominalizing rather than
a disquotational role. Horwich’s account adopts propositions, so the axioms of his
account (such as ‘The proposition that snow is white is true just in case snow is white’)
involve no disquotation (unlike in sentential accounts like Quine’s and Field’s).
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of example, consider the sentence ‘Something Kant said is true’. The
deflationist offers a translation of that sentence without using the truth
predicate. The deflationist might offer a quantified statement: ‘There exists
some p such that Kant said that p and p’.6 Or the deflationist might offer
an infinitely long statement: ‘Kant said that snow is white, and snow is
white, or Kant said that grass is green, and grass is green, or . . .’. The
deflationist claims that any use of the truth predicate similarly can be
circumvented. Nevertheless, the truth predicate has an important expres-
sive role to play in our language, in that it allows us to make such infinitely
long statements in a manageable, finite manner.
Although all deflationists accept linguistic deflationism, some substan-
tivists do as well (e.g., Frege [1918–19] 1956). Thus, deflationists are also
marked by their adoption of a second thesis, conceptual deflationism.
Conceptual deflationism is the view that truth does not play an indis-
pensable role in the philosophical analysis or explanation of other con-
cepts that goes beyond its function as a device for disquotation or de-
nominalization. For example, Michael Williams writes that “the function
of truth talk is wholly expressive, thus never explanatory. . . . What makes
deflationary views deflationary is their insistence that the importance of
truth talk is exhausted by its expressive function” (1999, 547). Were an
analysis to regard truth either as a conceptual primitive (as in Davidson
1996), or as an essential component of the analysis beyond its disquo-
tational or denominalizing role, the analyst would be relying on truth in
a robust, nondeflationary manner. Consider, for example, Frege’s analysis
of assertion. Frege embraces linguistic deflationism: “It seems, then, that
nothing is added to the thought by my ascribing to it the property of
truth” ([1918–19] 1956, 293). Yet he thinks that what separates assertions
(my sincere expression of my belief that snow is white) from nonassertoric
speech acts (an actor’s saying that snow is white during a performance)
is that assertions put forward a thought as being true. Substantivists about
truth can analyze the concept of assertion by appealing to the notion of
truth—they can allow that there is a rich conceptual connection between
truth and assertion. Deflationists, however, must deny that there are any
such connections. Both the linguistic and conceptual deflationary theses
can be attributed to most deflationists. No substantivist would subscribe
to conceptual deflationism, so the two theses in combination adequately
define a standard deflationist position.7 The task now is to determine
whether constructive empiricism can sustain such deflationism.
6. The quantification here is usually understood substitutionally.
7. Bar-On and Simmons (2007) also identify a third deflationary thesis, metaphysical
deflationism, which states that truth is not a genuine property. But Horwich admits
that truth is a perfectly good property and thus seems to reject metaphysical defla-
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3. Constructive Empiricism and Deflationary Truth: A First Pass. In order
for constructive empiricism and deflationism about truth to form a con-
sistent pair, the deflationist constructive empiricist must be able to offer
a statement of his view that does not rely conceptually on truth in any
way that goes beyond its disquotational or denominalizing role. Con-
structive empiricism is the view that the aim of scientific inquiry is to
produce empirically adequate theories, where a theory is empirically ad-
equate just in case everything involving the observable features of ob-
servable objects to which the theory is committed is true (van Fraassen
1980, 12). Since that position makes reference to the concept of truth, we
must investigate whether it can be disquoted or denominalized away in
typical deflationist fashion. Now, what the account needs to look like
depends on whether the syntactic or semantic view of theories is adopted.
According to the syntactic view, scientific theories are identified as sets
of sentences. On the semantic account, a scientific theory is identified as
a class of models, each offering a putative representation of the world.
Van Fraassen argues against the syntactic theory (1980, 53–56) and has
been a leading proponent of the semantic account. I shall assume alongside
van Fraassen that those arguments are decisive (see also Suppe 1989) and
that constructive empiricists should adopt the semantic account of the-
ories. Nevertheless, it will be instructive to look at what truth and em-
pirical adequacy would look like for the deflationist on the syntactic view,
were we indeed able to think of theories as mere sets of sentences.
Our goal is to offer an analysis of the truth and empirical adequacy of
a scientific theory in such a way that it relies on truth only as a device
for disquotation or denominalization. Above, we saw that deflationists
divide as to whether they rely on quantified statements (‘There is some p
such that Kant said that p and p’) or infinitary statements (‘Kant said
that snow is white, and snow is white, or . . .’). For ease of exposition,
I shall assume the latter approach.8 As a first pass, then, consider the
following deflationary accounts of truth and empirical adequacy:
T1. Scientific theory T is true if and only if: T entails ‘There are
electrons’ if and only if there are electrons, and T entails ‘Snow is
white’ if and only if snow is white, and . . .
EA1. Scientific theory T is empirically adequate if and only if: if ‘There
are electrons’ expresses only observable (putative) facts, then T entails
‘There are electrons’ if and only if there are electrons, and if ‘Snow
tionism (1990, 38). Hence, I am not considering metaphysical deflationism to be nec-
essary for the kind of deflationism I am engaging.
8. There is a rich literature debating the relative merits of the two approaches. See
Horwich 1990, David 1994, Hill 2002, and Künne 2003 for a representative sample.
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is white’ expresses only observable (putative) facts, then T entails
‘Snow is white’ if and only if snow is white, and . . .9
T1 is straightforward and is what one would expect from a deflationist.
The biconditionals that form each of its conjuncts ensure that T is com-
prehensive. When speaking of theories, van Fraassen routinely observes
that they must speak to all the phenomena in order to be empirically
adequate, and to the entire world in order to be true (e.g., 1980, 64, and
1989, 226). EA1 is more worrisome, as it singles out those sentences that
“express only observable (putative) facts.” A complete defense of EA1
should include an explanation of what it is for a sentence to express only
observable (putative) facts. Some logical positivists took recourse here to
a pure observation language. But since such an appeal is unlikely now-
adays to provide a satisfying method for distinguishing a theory’s em-
pirical and unempirical consequences, the advocate of the syntactic view
must offer some other syntactic account of when sentences express only
observable (putative) facts. The legacy of the syntactic account suggests
that no such project will be successful. I have no argument for the con-
clusion that no adequate defense of the syntactic view is forthcoming.
Instead, I shall continue to assume with van Fraassen that the semantic
view of theories is preferable to the syntactic view and that constructive
empiricists ought not to take on the burden of defending the latter.
Now, the reason that we cannot accept T1 and EA1 is not that they rely
on truth in a nondeflationary matter. T1 is acceptable to the deflationist,
and EA1 is as well, provided that observability also can be analyzed with-
out in turn relying on truth in a nondeflationary way.10 This essay is not
the place to delve into van Fraassen’s understanding of observability, but
it is worth pointing out that it is at least plausible that he will not need
to appeal to truth in order to offer an analysis of observability. Objects
are observable in virtue of features such as their size, color, and odor. It
is not obvious how truth might make its way into that picture.11 So the
problem for T1 and EA1 is that they rely on the inadequate syntactic
account of scientific theories, an account which the constructive empiricist
9. I make reference to “putative” facts so as to disallow theories that include false
implications about the observable from being true. For example, consider an otherwise
true theory that also included the sentence ‘Snow is green’. It is false that the sentence
expresses only observable facts (for it expresses something false), but it is true that it
expresses only observable (putative) facts. Were it not to mention putative facts, EA1
would hold that the ‘Snow is green’ theory is empirically adequate. Note that I am
employing ‘fact’ in a neutral way. By ‘fact’ I simply mean ‘true bearer of truth’.
10. My thanks to an anonymous referee for calling my attention to this point.
11. See Muller 2005 for a detailed examination into what kind of account of observ-
ability a constructive empiricist may hold.
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does not accept. Accordingly, we must now develop an account of the
truth and empirical adequacy of scientific theories that utilizes the se-
mantic account instead. For the constructive empiricist, a theory is true
just in case one of its models is isomorphic to the actual world and
empirically adequate just in case the empirical substructures of one of its
models are isomorphic to the observable world (van Fraassen 1989, 226–
227). Our task now is to determine whether the deflationist can make
sense of such notions.
4. The Game of Life. We can understand better the semantic (or model-
theoretic) account of scientific theories by examining a very simple ex-
ample that utilizes John Horton Conway’s game Life (see Gardner 1970).
Let me stress just how much simplicity is involved. No actual scientific
theory is anywhere near as simple as the Life theories I shall be consid-
ering. Still, I find the Life example to be instructive precisely because of
its simplicity. Since the problem for the deflationist constructive empiricist
is present even in our simple example, it is unlikely to disappear in the
context of a more complicated theory.
Life provides a simple deterministic system such that its future states
systematically can be deduced from its earlier states. A Life world consists
of a two-dimensional grid of cells. At any given time, each cell is in one
of two possible states (ON or OFF). Any noninitial configuration of the
grid can be deduced from the previous configuration and the “laws” that
describe the transformations of the grid over time.12 Whether a cell is ON
or OFF at a particular time depends entirely on whether its neighboring
cells (including diagonals) were ON or OFF during the previous time. Life
operates according to three simple rules:
A1. If at time tn any cell has exactly two neighboring ON cells, then
that cell remains in the same state at .tn1
A2. If at time tn any cell has exactly three neighboring ON cells, then
that cell is ON at .tn1
A3. If at time tn a cell is under any other condition, then that cell is
OFF at .tn1
Figure 1 shows a simple three-stage Life transformation on a nine-celled
grid (gray squares denote the ON position, white squares the OFF position):
Were this pattern to be continued, all subsequent configurations (at t3 and
beyond) would be identical to the entirely OFF configuration at t2 (for a
“dead” grid cannot be “resuscitated”).
12. The “laws” here are not assumed to be anything that might be distasteful to a
constructive empiricist (or van Fraassen himself—see his 1989).
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Figure 1.
We can use the Game of Life to give an example of what a model-
based scientific theory looks like. Imagine a universe that consisted of
nothing more than what we find in the Life universe, a universe that could
be described exhaustively by specifying at every time whether each of its
cells was in the ON or OFF state. Suppose we wanted to construct a
scientific theory that modeled such a universe. To do so, we would need
to define the mathematical structures that will serve as representations of
the various components of the universe. The first thing to be defined would
be a set of nine ordered pairs, each representing a cell on the grid:
. We would also need to define the neighbor relation,{A1, 1S, A1, 2S, . . . , A3, 3S}
which specifies the cells that are neighbors to each other. Also included
would be the axioms A1, A2, and A3, which serve as the laws, or just
fundamental regularities, of the theory. Given that minimal structure and
apparatus, the theory can be defined in terms of a set of models that are
consistent with the given structure. Distinguishing each model of the Life
theory would be a function that assigned to each ordered pair an initial
value from the set {0, 1}, representing the features OFF and ON, respec-
tively. The individual moments of time in the Life universe are assigned
natural numbers. Since our universe has nine cells, there are 29 or 512
unique initial configurations.13 Because the Life universe operates deter-
ministically, each initial configuration leads to one particular future. Now
suppose that the history of the universe began as in the example above,
with each cell initially in the ON position. Because the universe is a Life
universe, it behaves according to the axioms of the theory. Thus, the Life
theory offers an accurate representation of the universe, for one of its
13. Note that one could define the Life theory without building into the structure that
there are nine cells. One might instead offer a more general version of the theory that
left it open to the individual models to specify how many cells were in the universe.
Such a theory would have infinitely many models, 512 of which are the ones included
in the narrower theory I am offering.
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models (namely, the one whose initializing function assigns ‘1’ to each
ordered pair) correctly describes the actual state of each cell at every time
of its history.
To summarize, then, our Life theory L of the nine-celled universe is to
be identified with a set of 512 models. Each model of L is in turn identified
with a single function. That function takes two inputs, ordered pairs
defined over {1, 2, 3} and members of the set of natural numbers, and
maps them to a member from the set {0, 1}. What makes each of the 512
models models of L is the fact that it is consistent with the above axioms
of the Life game. Models that are not consistent with those axioms are
not models of L. For example, the function that assigns ‘1’ to each ordered
pair at t0 and yet assigns ‘1’ also to each ordered pair at t1 is not a model
of L but perhaps of some other non-Life theory.14
Another feature of the Game of Life is that it easily can be modified
to make sense of the distinction between observables and unobservables,
making it an especially helpful example for the constructive empiricist.
One way that one might introduce the distinction is simply by demarcating
some of the Life matrix as being unobservable. For example, suppose
that the top row of the Life world depicted above is unobservable. State-
ments involving the features of the top row would not count as expressing
observable phenomena, whereas statements involving only the lower two
rows would. Constructive empiricists can find that picture of the unob-
servable appealing, for it suggests that the unobservable and observable
are “metaphysically continuous”: the unobservable regions of the universe
are just as real as the observable regions and have the same features. The
regions differ only in their epistemic accessibility (for whatever reason
that might be). Further, the empirical substructures of a model easily
could be defined. The empirical substructures in the case of a Life world
would be identical to partial functions that map only the observable
regions of the cell matrix paired with times to the relevant values.
The Game of Life is helpful in elucidating what constitutes a model of
a scientific theory. But there is more to the semantic view of theories than
just models. The view is semantic because it stresses that scientific theories
always involve an intended interpretation.15 For the Life world depicted
14. Van Fraassen’s own presentation of the model-theoretic view of theories differs
slightly from my own, given his choice of examples. (He also presents his view using
the technical vocabulary of state spaces, elementary statements, and satisfaction func-
tions.) The picture provided using the Life game, I think, better helps elucidate the
potentially confounding notion of a model. For full exposition of van Fraassen’s
description of models, see van Fraassen 1970, 328–329, and 1972, 311–312; Suppe
1989; and Thompson 1989, 77–81.
15. See van Fraassen 1997 for an excellent discussion of just how important interpre-
tations are.
432 JAMIN ASAY
above, L provides an accurate picture of the universe—one of its models
is perfectly isomorphic to every state of that universe’s history. But we
must understand L as the conjunction of its models and an interpretation.
The theory’s interpretation plays the role of pairing the mathematical
structure of the theory’s models with the real features of the world. To
define the intended interpretation I of L, we need to define three one-one
functions. The first (i1) takes cells to ordered pairs. In the Life world, the
cells are the real objects. Hence I includes a function taking cells, each
named with a letter from {A, B, . . . , I}, to ordered pairs defined over
{1, 2, 3}. Next there is a function (i2) that takes the real features OFF and
ON to members of the set {0, 1}, respectively. Finally, a third function (i3)
maps actual times with the set of natural numbers: t0 with 0, t1 with 1,
and so on. I now provides a semantics for L. L, again, includes 512 models,
which constitute the set of functions {M1, M2, . . . , M512}. Each model
Mn is a function that takes two inputs (an ordered pair and a natural
number) to the set {0, 1}. Let F be a variable ranging over the set of
cells, J a variable ranging over the set of features, and t a variable ranging
over the set of times. We can now define the notion of truth-in-a-Life
model: For any Life sentence of the form ‘F is J at t’,
‘F is J at t’ is true-in-Mn if and only if Mn(i1(F), i3(t)) p i2(J).
Hence, the ordinary statements that can be used to describe the Life
universe (‘A is ON at t0’, ‘E is OFF at t2’) can be evaluated from the
perspective of each model of the theory. Such statements often will be
true in some models but not in others. For example, consider the sentence
‘A is ON at t0’. From the perspective of M1, the model where every cell
begins in the OFF position, the sentence is false (not true-in-M1). M1 says
that the first cell in the grid is OFF at the initial time: .M (A1, 1S, 0) p 01
From the perspective of M512, the model where every cell begins in the
ON position, the sentence is true (true-in-M512): .M (A1, 1S, 0) p 1512
We have now defined the notion of truth-in-a-Life model, which will
be useful in offering the accounts of truth and empirical adequacy that
the deflationist constructive empiricist can offer. A true theory, again, is
one that has a model that is isomorphic to the actual world. An empirically
adequate theory is one that has a model whose empirical substructures
are isomorphic to all phenomena. We can now analyze truth and empirical
adequacy in terms of truth-in-a-model, as defined above. We shall also
need to employ the derivative notion of truth-in-an-empirical substructure
(true-in-En). That notion could be defined similarly, for the empirical sub-
structures of a model are just a partial function of the model’s function,
a function whose domain is a subset of the model’s domain. (In our case,
the partial function operates over just the ordered pairs representing the
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two lower rows of cells.) The following accounts naturally suggest them-
selves:
T2. Scientific theory T is true if and only if there is a model Mn of
T such that ‘There are electrons’ is true-in-Mn if and only if there
are electrons, and ‘Snow is white’ is true-in-Mn if and only if snow
is white, and . . .
EA2. Scientific theory T is empirically adequate if and only if there
is a model Mn of T and an empirical substructure En of Mn such that
if ‘There are electrons’ is decided by En, then ‘There are electrons’ is
true-in-En if and only if there are electrons, and if ‘Snow is white’ is
decided by En, then ‘Snow is white’ is true-in-En if and only if snow
is white, and . . .
Note that the biconditionals appearing in the definition of empirical ad-
equacy are nested as the consequents of conditional statements whose
antecedents make use of the notion of decidability. The empirical sub-
structures of models fall silent on matters concerning the unobservable.
For example, if the sentence ‘A is ON at t0’ expresses an unobservable
(putative) fact, then it will fail to be true in the empirical substructures
of the models of L (even if it is true in the corresponding models), since
the functions used to define the notion of truth-in-En are undefined with
respect to cell A. Hence, ‘A is ON at t0’ fails to be decided by E1, E2, and
all the others. Only statements concerning exclusively the observable will
be decided by empirical substructures; EA2 is thus defined so as to make
statements involving the unobservable irrelevant to the evaluation of a
theory’s empirical adequacy.
5. Why Constructive Empiricists Cannot Be Deflationists. We have now
seen what kind of accounts of truth and empirical adequacy the construc-
tive empiricist has on offer if he hopes to demonstrate that his notions
are consistent with both the semantic account of scientific theories and
the deflationary theory of truth. Our task now is to explore why even
those accounts are inadequate and cannot be sustained by deflationists.
I shall raise four separate objections, in ascending order of importance,
which are all related to the appeal to truth-in-a-model. First, the defla-
tionist constructive empiricist is at pains to explain what truth-in-a-model
is for a real scientific theory. Second, the deflationist constructive empir-
icist cannot say, in general, in what truth-in-a-model consists. As a result,
his account reduces truth to indefinitely many further semantic concepts.
Third, the deflationist constructive empiricist cannot explain why truth-
in-a-model, rather than some other notion, is central to understanding
the aim of science. Finally, and most decisively, T2 and EA2 are not even
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disquotational accounts of truth and empirical adequacy, despite appear-
ances to the contrary.
The first problem for the deflationist constructive empiricist deals with
specifying what truth-in-a-model is for genuine scientific theories. Above
we saw what a truth-in-a-Life model is. Equipped with that understanding,
we can fully specify what it is for a Life theory to be true. What, however,
of other theories? What is it for the theory of Newtonian mechanics or
the theory of evolution by natural selection to be true? Presumably, any
adequately developed scientific theory includes an adequately developed
interpretation. Theories are tested against the world, and thus interpre-
tations are needed in order to connect the theory’s mathematical structures
with the phenomena observed in the world. Giving an account of what
those interpretations are is certainly an arduous task. For the simple and
contrived Life theory, formulating the interpretation is fairly uncompli-
cated. Real scientific theories involve far more intricate mathematical
structure. In the actual world, it is true that snow is white. But what is
it for ‘Snow is white’ to be true in the models of general relativity, or
quantum mechanics? For the deflationist constructive empiricist, the heart
of the problem is this: if we lack an understanding of the interpretation
of a scientific theory, and thus lack an understanding of what truth-in-a-
model is for that theory, then our understanding of what it is for that
theory to be true or empirically adequate is also incomplete. As a result,
the deflationist cannot say what it is for some genuine scientific theory
to be true or empirically adequate; furthermore, to the extent that his
account is incomplete, he cannot be confident that the notions of truth
and empirical adequacy to which he appeals are even open to the defla-
tionist (for an inconsistency may be lurking in the details).
There is a far greater difficulty, however, for the above accounts of truth
and empirical adequacy. The crux of the problem for the deflationist lies
in the fact that the definientia they offer for truth and empirical adequacy
involve the semantic notion of truth-in-a-model, which cannot be under-
stood as a general, intertheoretical notion. Instead, the notion must always
be understood relative to the theory whose truth or empirical adequacy
is at stake. Because there is no general notion of truth-in-a-model, the
deflationist is left without a way of articulating, in general, in what the
truth or empirical adequacy of a theory consists. Recall that for the typical
deflationist, the truth predicate exists solely for its disquotational or de-
nominalizing functions. The truth predicate allows us to say things like
‘Something Kant said is true’, things that would be impossible to say
without the truth predicate on account of their infinite length. Neverthe-
less, the deflationist can show what those infinite statements look like and
note how they do not presuppose any further semantic notions. The truth
predicate, for the deflationist, is conceptually isolated, unsupported by
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further semantic notions. It can be done away with. That kind of defla-
tionism about truth is simply not possible for the deflationist constructive
empiricist who advocates T2 and EA2. The deflationist, of course, is always
free to make use of the truth predicate. He can say, for example, that the
aim of science is to produce theories that are true to the phenomena. But
to demonstrate that truth, in his understanding of the aim of science, is
functioning only as a device for disquotation or denominalization, the
deflationist must be able to offer an account devoid of any further mention
of semantic concepts ( just as the deflationist account of ‘Something Kant
said is true’ makes no use of any such concept). What the deflationist
constructive empiricist appears to have to do, however, is make reference
not to just one further semantic concept but to indefinitely many semantic
concepts—one for each model of every possible scientific theory. Con-
sequently, the deflationist constructive empiricist has not yet offered an
account of his position that is acceptable on deflationary grounds. His
analysis of truth (and empirical adequacy also) must rely on indefinitely
many semantic concepts (most of which are concepts for which he has
no complete understanding).
Perhaps the above two objections are not fully convincing. The defla-
tionist might offer the following reply:
When it comes to the interpretations of our best current scientific
theories, we of course do not have a fully worked out account, but
neither does anyone else. It is unreasonable to charge deflationists
with a special burden due to the incomplete interpretations. Further,
our account does indeed reduce truth to the notion of truth-in-a-
model. We admit that there is no generalized account of the truth of
scientific theories—but that is exactly what we always have been
stressing: truth is a thin concept, one that does not require a general
account. There is nothing, in fact, that true theories have in common.
Further, although we have reduced truth to truth-in-a-model, there
is nothing metaphysically substantive about truth-in-a-model. In fact,
we have seen an example (the Life theory) that defines explicitly what
truth-in-a-model is. Truth-in-a-model is merely a technical mathe-
matical notion, defined by stipulation, and thus devoid of meta-
physical substance. To understand it we do not need to bring in
metaphysical posits like a correspondence relation or realm of facts.
Finally, as T2 and EA2 clearly show, truth-in-a-model still functions
as a device for disquotation. Hence, they are after all acceptable to
the deflationist.
The deflationist’s reply, however, is lacking. Let us consider in turn each
of his rebuttals. The deflationist is correct to point out that no one, even
those who adopt the most robust account of truth available, has an ad-
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equate grasp of what the interpretations are for our best scientific theories.
Still, it seems that deflationists carry an extra burden as a result of the
missing interpretations. If the deflationist constructive empiricist wishes
to appeal to the concept of truth when articulating his position, he must
be prepared to demonstrate that the notion presupposes nothing more
substantive than a deflationist can allow. Since his account of truth rests
on numerous other concepts (all varieties of truth-in-a-model), the defla-
tionist is at pains to show that those concepts are themselves acceptable
to the deflationist. To the extent that the deflationist constructive empir-
icist leaves unanalyzed the constituents of his notion of truth, he cannot
claim justifiably that his account is genuinely deflationary.
Further, while it is true that the deflationist usually (and justifiably)
claims not to be obligated to offering a general account of truth, the
deflationist constructive empiricist is so obliged. Constructive empiricists
employ the concept of truth for a use that goes beyond truth’s typical
disquotational and denominalizing role, for they use it in formulating
both their and their opponent’s positions. According to the constructive
empiricist, the aim of science is to construct empirically adequate theories,
regardless of what kind of theory is being considered. The deflationist
constructive empiricist’s statement about his own position appeals to the
notion of empirical adequacy simpliciter, yet he has no recourse to a
similar, general notion of truth-in-an-empirical substructure for his defla-
tionist reduction. If the central thesis of constructive empiricism is to have
any content at all, it must be anchored by some general concept of truth-
in-a-model.
As we have seen, the deflationist constructive empiricist appeals to
indefinitely many individual notions of truth-in-a-model. It is a fair ques-
tion, then, to ask what those notions have in common and why they are
all acceptable on metaphysically austere deflationary grounds. We have
now arrived at the third objection. Given the formalized definition of
truth-in-a-Life model that I offered above, it may appear that the notion
is metaphysically innocuous. The notion was defined mathematically, with
no reference to a suspicious correspondence relation or anything else
typically distasteful to the deflationist. Notice, though, that we could have
defined several other notions as well. Let us define the notion of waarheid-
in-a-model.16 Suppose we add another one-one function, i4, to our inter-
pretation I of the Life theory. The new function, like i2, assigns to features
members of {0, 1}, but makes the opposite assignments. Thus, i4(ON) p
0 and i4(OFF) p 1. Now we can define the notion of ‘waar-in-Mn’: for
any Life sentence of the form ‘F is J at t’,
16. ‘Waarheid’ is Dutch for ‘truth’.
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‘F is J at t’ is waar-in-Mn if and only if M (i (F), i (t)) p i (J).n 1 3 4
As the two semantic notions are defined, no basic Life sentence can be
both true-in-Mn and waar-in-Mn for the same n. (Indeed, ‘waar’ seems to
be synonymous with ‘false’!) Now, clearly the deflationist must opt for
using true-in-Mn rather than waar-in-Mn in his definition of truth for a
Life theory. But what rationale can the deflationist offer to explain why
the former concept belongs in his notion of truth rather than the latter?
Further, even supposing that we define a true theory as in T2, and a waar
theory analogously (by substituting ‘waar’ everywhere ‘true’ appears),
what explanation could we offer for why the realist thinks that the aim
of science is to produce true theories, rather than waar theories? And why
should the constructive empiricist think that the aim of science is to pro-
duce theories that are true to the phenomena, rather than waar to the
phenomena?
The appropriate response to those questions, it seems to me, involves
some reasoning like the following: of all the semantic notions of which
we can conceive, one in particular stands out. For our Life theory, defining
what it is for a sentence to be true-in-Mn is essential for understanding
what it is for a Life theory to be true. Other notions, like waar-in-Mn and
indefinitely many others that we could define at our leisure, simply do
not suffice. Truth-in-Mn is the privileged semantic notion and not because
of its arbitrarily chosen name (I could very well have swapped ‘true’ and
‘waar’ throughout this essay, in which case ‘waar-in-Mn’ would denote the
privileged semantic notion). Regardless of the theory we are considering,
there will be one crucial semantic notion, one relevant to the truth eval-
uability of that theory, that must be distinguished from all other notions
we may wish to define. When interpreting evolutionary theory, for ex-
ample, we must offer an interpretation of the models of the theory and
pinpoint the specific property that is constitutive of truth for evolutionary
theory. That property is the correct one for defining truth in evolutionary
theory, just as truth-in-Mn is the correct one for defining truth in the Life
theory. The deflationist has no explanation for why those notions, rather
than any other one, are the correct notions for understanding truth and
cannot say what it is that those notions have in common that separates
them from their contenders. For deflationists, truth is merely a device for
disquotation or denominalization; it is not to be understood as a privileged
semantic notion, as the constructive empiricist must take it to be. That
constructive empiricists must privilege some semantic notions above oth-
ers is evidence that they cannot rely on a metaphysically austere concep-
tion of truth.
Finally, consider the deflationist’s claim that the various kinds of truth-
in-a-model function as disquotational devices and thus are acceptable on
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deflationary grounds. Granted, truth-in-Mn appears to be disquotational
in T2 (as does truth-in-En in EA2), which includes biconditionals like
‘Snow is white’ is true-in-Mn if and only if snow is white.
Such biconditionals resemble classic “T-sentences” like
‘Snow is white’ is true if and only if snow is white.
For deflationists, T-sentences typically are necessarily true, for their left
and right conditions are cognitively equivalent. However, the bicondi-
tionals forming T2 are importantly different. Consider again the Life sen-
tence ‘A is ON at t0’, and suppose that the world is as M512 depicts it (with
all cells initially ON, as shown in the figure at the start of Section 4). Now,
ex hypothesi, our Life theory L is true because one of its models (namely,
M512) is isomorphic to the actual world. Let us then instantiate T2 with
L and M512. Doing so generates the biconditional
‘A is ON at t0’ is true-in-M512 if and only if A is ON at t0.
It seems, then, that we have defined truth in terms of truth-in-M512 and
have then employed truth-in-M512 merely as a device for disquotation.
There appears to be nothing here that is unsavory to the deflationist.
However, appearances here are deceiving. The biconditional I have iso-
lated, while true, is only contingently true. Its left condition is essentially
a mathematical truth; regardless of whether the actual world is accurately
described by M1, M2, or some other Mn, the sentence ‘‘A is ON at t0’ is
true-in-M512’ is true, and necessarily so. However, the right-hand condition
expresses a contingent matter of fact. In some worlds A is OFF at t0, and
in some worlds it is ON at t0. Hence the biconditionals constituting T2 are
only contingently true. That the biconditionals forming T2 are contingent
is important because such a conclusion is at odds with the traditional
deflationist understanding of T-sentences. Deflationists typically take T-
sentences to be necessarily true (Horwich 1990 and Field 1994 are prime
examples). Since truth, on their view, is a deflated notion, predicating it
of something adds no substance to it. As a result, T-sentences are nec-
essarily true, for their left-hand conditions bear no cognitive content not
already possessed by their right-hand conditions. For deflationists, T-
sentences are vacuous. As a result, deflationists and substantivists disagree
on the modal status of T-sentences: substantivists typically argue that T-
sentences, while true, are contingent. Whether certain T-sentences are true
depends on contingent matters of fact including, among others, facts in-
volving the meanings of certain words. Deflationists should thus hesitate
to embrace a view that requires T-sentences to be metaphysically contingent.
Further, we must recognize that when deflationists claim that truth-in-
M512 is operating only as a device for disquotation, they are ignoring the
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element of interpretation that makes the T-sentences that feature it true.
Indeed, assuming the world to be as M512 describes it, the biconditional
‘A is ON at t0’ is true-in-M512 if and only if A is ON at t0
is true. It is misleading, however, to think of that biconditional as being
partially constitutive of the deflationist constructive empiricist’s definition
of truth. The kind of biconditional that is really constitutive of truth for
the deflationist constructive empiricist is far more complicated and not
at all disquotational:
‘A is ON at t0’ is true-in-M512 if and only if M (i (A), i (t )) p512 1 3 0
i (ON).2
That kind of biconditional satisfies the condition of being necessarily true
(for each of its conditions are mathematical truths), but it clearly shows
that truth-in-M512 is not a device for disquotation. As we saw above, the
biconditionals forming T2 are only contingently true, and thus the infer-
ence from ‘‘A is ON at t0’ is true-in-M512’ to ‘A is ON at t0’ is not logically
secure. If truth-in-M512 were a genuine device for disquotation, that in-
ference would be trivial. The biconditionals that are constitutive of truth-
in-M512 are formed from conditions that clearly are not cognitively equiv-
alent; the left-hand side involves sentences from normal English, and the
right-hand side involves only complicated mathematical symbolizations.
Consequently, we arrive at the appearance of a disquotable sentence only
through a detour involving a complicated translation between ordinary
English and the mathematical language of the Life theory’s interpretation.
What we have in the notion of truth-in-a-Life model is not something
that resembles straightforward disquotation. On a typical deflationist pro-
gram, truth is immediately disquotable: no translation or further premise
is required to fuel the inference between ‘‘Snow is white’ is true’ and
‘Snow is white’. For the notion of truth-in-a-model, no such immediate
disquotation is possible, since the theoretical interpretation is playing a
necessary, mediating role. Truth-in-a-model, regardless of the version be-
ing considered, cannot function as a simple device for disquotation, as
the deflationist would have it.
To summarize, the deflationist constructive empiricist characterizes the
aim of science as pursuing empirical adequacy, which is defined in terms
of truth. Since the deflationist must show that his appeal to truth is
acceptable on deflationary grounds, he must show that his reliance on
truth does not go beyond its disquotational or denominalizing features.
Further, as a constructive empiricist, he must understand theories as sets
of models paired with an interpretation. The attempts at offering a de-
flationary analysis of the truth and empirical adequacy of scientific the-
ories end up relying on further semantic notions, which is already a strike
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against the deflationist (for deflationist reductions tend to include no
further semantic notions, as in the breakdown of ‘Something Kant said
is true’). Further, those additional semantic notions—in most cases no-
tions that are likely never to be defined explicitly—raise the question of
why they are crucial to the notion of theory truth and theory empirical
adequacy rather than other semantic notions, a question that deflationists
are at pains to answer. As a result, the deflationist lacks a rationale for
saying what it is that the various semantic notions he must employ all
share such that they are the relevant notions for evaluating a theory’s
empirical adequacy and truth. Finally, deflationists are faced with the
severe problem that the notion of truth-in-a-model on which they rely
does not serve as a disquotational device at all, contrary to what might
appear to be the case: T2 and EA2 are simply not disquotational accounts
of truth and empirical adequacy. In short, without relying on the resources
of a substantive account of truth, the deflationist suffers the inability of
offering accounts of truth and empirical adequacy that are required to
make sense of constructive empiricism.
6. Conclusion. If my diagnosis is correct, constructive empiricists require
a more substantive account of truth than can be offered by deflationists.
Deflationists, recall, subscribe to the thesis of conceptual deflationism,
the claim that truth is not richly connected with other philosophical con-
cepts—that its conceptual contributions are limited to its disquotational
and denominalizing functions. My aim has been to show that mere de-
flationary truth does not suffice for the constructive empiricist’s account
of key notions in the philosophy of science: the truth and empirical ad-
equacy of scientific theories, scientific realism, and even constructive em-
piricism itself.
What conclusion is to be drawn? Should constructive empiricism be
rejected as an untenable philosophy of science, given the many merits of
deflationism? Should constructive empiricism be rejected as unmotivated—
or even incoherent—since one of its major motivations (metaphysical asep-
ticism) is undermined by its commitment to a robust theory of truth?17
Perhaps constructive empiricism’s very construal of the nature of realism
and empiricism should be rejected, thus paving the way for novel ways
of articulating the realism debate in the philosophy of science.18 Or, al-
ternatively, should deflationism about truth be rejected, given its failure
17. Ladyman, in an argument not dissimilar to my own, takes that option after arguing
that constructive empiricists are committed to a substantive account of modality (2000).
See Monton and van Fraassen 2003, Ladyman 2004, and Muller 2005 for further
discussion.
18. I take Crispin Wright (1992) to adopt that option.
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to adequately account for what the constructive empiricist claims to be
the aim of science? I have not argued in defense of one of those conclusions
rather than the others; I merely have tried to identify an inconsistency
between two philosophical views that otherwise would seem to form a
natural pair. Constructive empiricists and deflationists both share the
desire to offer their theories with as little recourse to metaphysics as is
necessary. My own suspicion is that the constructive empiricist’s analysis
of the dispute between empiricists and realists has much to recommend
it; traditionally, truth has played a prominent role in discussions of realism
(see Sayre-McCord 1986), and I see no conclusive reason to dispute that
centrality. Van Fraassen’s characterization of realism and empiricism is
natural and convincing: the realist argues that the aim of science is to
discover the truth about the world, while the empiricist argues that science
aims to achieve empirical adequacy, to discover the truth about the phe-
nomenal world. If truth and realism are indeed inextricably linked, then
we have reason to be suspicious of conceptual deflationism—we appear
to have an area of ripe philosophical inquiry where truth seems to be put
to use beyond its role as a device for disquotation and denominalization.
Hence, I am inclined to think that truth is not merely a tool for disquoting
and denominalizing. Deflationists were correct to identify those functions
of the truth predicate, but there is more to truth than its basic linguistic
functions. Truth is a rich concept, essential to our understanding of the aim
of science.
What, to conclude, of constructive empiricism’s call for metaphysical
austerity? Does my contention that it requires a substantive account of
truth undermine the spirit of empiricism that drives and motivates van
Fraassen’s preferred philosophy of science? One response available to the
constructive empiricist, though not a particularly interesting one, is that
he never claimed to offer a philosophy of science with no metaphysical
commitments, just one with as little metaphysics as possible. As it turns
out, it is just not possible to make do without a substantive theory of
truth. However, there are more fruitful responses. For instance, the con-
structive empiricist can distinguish between the metaphysical commit-
ments one undertakes in accepting a scientific theory and the metaphysical
commitments one undertakes in accepting a philosophical position like
constructive empiricism. My arguments for why constructive empiricists
cannot be deflationists only relate to the latter kind of commitment. The
constructive empiricist can agree with my conclusions and maintain that
I have not shown that what it is to accept a scientific theory is any more
metaphysically committing than he originally stated. It is only the one
who embraces the philosophical position of constructive empiricism who
is burdened with a more substantive account of truth. The original, austere
conception of what is involved in accepting a scientific theory is unchanged.
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Another possible response points toward future research. I have not
argued for exactly what kind of truth the constructive empiricist requires;
rather, I have argued only that a deflationary account is insufficient. The
constructive empiricist needs an account that is more robust than that
offered by the deflationist, but it does not follow from my conclusion that
a constructive empiricist requires, say, a classical correspondence theory
of truth. Objections to correspondence theories are well known, and con-
structive empiricists might do well to share along with deflationists (and
van Fraassen himself now) the worries that motivated deflationism in the
first place. Still, there may be another option. Perhaps there is a theory
of truth that, while more substantive than a bare deflationary account,
nevertheless avoids the excesses of traditional correspondence theories.
Such a theory would be acceptable to the empiricist and could figure into
his account of the nature of scientific inquiry. The sort of conceptual
primitivism envisaged by Frege and Davidson may be such a view. The
primitivist can allow that there are deep conceptual connections between
truth and other philosophically important notions. Yet the primitivist is
not necessarily committed to the sorts of metaphysical posits that accom-
pany correspondence theories. After all, rejecting conceptual deflationism
is not tantamount to rejecting metaphysical deflationism. Primitivism
might offer just the sort of middle ground that the constructive empiricist
needs.
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